Call or fold? (Conclusion)

It took me a minute or so to process all of the possibilities. I finally decided that it was more likely that it was a situation in which I'd want to get my money in than one in which I wouldn't.

It was ultimately the speed and size of his bet that made me conclude that he probably did not have one of the three monsters I had to worry about (A-8, 8-7, or 7-7). The speed and size didn't ring true for those hands. I decided that it was quite a bit more likely that he had one of these: (1) the same hand as me; (2) a flush or straight draw that he was trying not to have to hit; (3) a straight-flush draw on which he was willing to gamble his stack*; (4) an 8 with a worse kicker. With any of those, I would be OK with playing for stacks. My very, very rough guess to myself was that the sum of these combinations was about twice as likely as that he had one of the monsters.

I don't like making big calls like that just verbally. I prefer to get the right number of chips and move it forward. The reason for this is purely psychological and irrational: I really hate counting out a big bunch of chips after I have learned that I have lost. I'd rather put them in the middle when I still have reason to believe they will be coming back to me, with interest. It's stupid, but that's how my mind works.

So after settling on the call, I put four red chips on top of a cluster of four stacks of $50 and pushed them all across the line.

The instant I released those stacks, my opponent said, "He's got me outkicked." A great relief washed over me.

It didn't last long. The dealer put out a deuce on the turn, and the guy added, "Oh, not any more." He flipped over 8s-2s.

I was down to three outs, and the dealer couldn't find me a king.

I wanted to barf, but that is frowned upon at Mandalay Bay, what with their quirky house rules and all.

As you can see, I was way off base in my assessment of him. I would never have guessed him as one who would have played 8-2 from UTG. That was based purely on a sense of what percentage of starting hands he played, which was nowhere near high enough to include 8-2 in his EP range. I don't know why he played it. Maybe it's his favorite hand.

Why did he raise so much? Again, I just don't know. It makes almost no sense. He obviously knew the instant I called that he was way behind. He had a decently strong hand, and with that bet turned it into a bluff, because he could only get a call when he was beaten. He had no reason to think I was bluffing; I had bluffed exactly once in that session, and it was long before he arrived. He had seen nothing but solid play from me. He should not have thought I was just on a draw after my reraise.

My best guess about this thought process is this: The reraise convinced him that I had an 8, so he knew he was impossibly far behind. He didn't want to have to make crying calls on the turn and river, so he made a snap decision to gamble that my kicker was small enough that I wouldn't dare call.

But whatever his reasoning (or lack thereof), I got the big money in as a better than 6:1 favorite (71% win for me, 11% win for him, 18% chop). As they say, there's not much more I can do than that.

I have previously quoted this excellent paragraph from one of Matt Lessinger's old Card Player columns, and it remains one of my go-to mental solaces when Bad Things like this happen to me:

I don't care if you are a rank novice or a world champion. It doesn't matter whether you are in a tournament or a cash game. You could be playing for pennies or Porsches. It's all the same. If you can get all of your money in as a 4-1 favorite, do it. And if you lose, live with it. It happens. Wait for the next opportunity to arise, and then do it again. If you are able to consistently create that scenario, you will be a successful player--end of story.

*It did not occur to me in the heat of the moment, but in retrospect this is a situation in which the existence of the high-hand jackpot probably weighed against his having the straight-flush draw. I think most $1-2 NLHE players would not want to pass up the chance to hit it and collect the bonus, and consequently they wouldn't be so eager to end the hand on the flop when only 4/5 of the way there. That is mathematically a fallacious decision, because the size of the bonus, combined with having only a roughly 8% chance of hitting one of the two needed cards, means that the effective pot odds are only marginally altered in a deep-stacked situation like this.